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How to prove, how to interpret and what to do?
Uncertainty experiences of street-level tax officials
Nadine Raaphorst
Department of Public Administration and Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam,
The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This study examines the kind of uncertainties frontline tax officials working with a
trust-based inspection approach experience in interacting with citizen-clients. The
classical literature on bureaucracy and the street-level bureaucracy literature suggest
frontline officials face two kinds of uncertainties: information and interpretation
problems. Analysing stories of Dutch frontline tax officials collected through in-
depth interviews, this article shows that these two kinds of uncertainty only explain
a part of the uncertainties experienced. Respondents also face action problems
requiring improvisational judgements. The study furthermore finds that different
sources underlie these uncertainties, pointing to possible explanations.
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Introduction
Street-level bureaucrats’ interactions with citizens have been studied extensively within
the domain of public service provision (e.g. Goodsell 1981; Katz et al. 1975; Lipsky 1980;
Prottas 1979). The street-level bureaucracy literature mainly focuses on how frontline
officials use their discretion, that is, the room for manoeuvre they have within the given
rules and regulations (e.g. Harrits and Møller 2014; Lipsky 1980). Studies within this
branch of literature often point to the open-endedness, ambiguity, and uncertainty of
everyday administrative work (e.g. Dubois 2014; Hoag 2011; Maynard-Moody and
Musheno 2003; Wagenaar 2004). In fact, uncertainty is inextricably linked to discre-
tionary decision-making; bureaucrats ‘derive their institutional necessity from these
uncertainties’ (Dubois 2014, p. 41). Although some scholars reflect on this frontline
uncertainty (e.g. Dubois 2014; Fassin 2013), there is still lack of understanding of the
kinds, conditions, and consequences of uncertainty at play in frontline work.
A deeper understanding of how officials respond to uncertainties is especially
important in light of managerial reforms that have put more emphasis on trust and
collaboration between officials and citizens. New Public Management reforms were
not only aimed at enlarging citizen-clients’ choice in public goods but also at
improving public officials’ performance and responsiveness (Bartels 2013; Pollitt
and Bouckaert 2004). Governance styles aimed at involving citizens, organizations,
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and other stakeholders in the process of policy-making and implementation embrace
notions as trust and collaboration. This is not only true for social welfare agencies but
also for organizations engaged in the more traditional regulation and law enforce-
ment functions of the government, such as inspection agencies and tax authorities
(e.g. Leviner 2009; Mascini and Van Wijk 2009). Such interpersonal notions as trust
and collaboration are not predefined but assumed to be part of officials’ professional
expertise (Evans 2015).
In fact, horizontal interactions between officials and citizens aimed at collabora-
tion and trust give frontline officials more leeway to act on the situation at hand,
which makes the bureaucratic process less determined (Dubois 2014). If bureaucrats’
actions are increasingly made dependent on their perceptions of citizens in interac-
tions, and to a lesser extent prescribed by formal rules, this leads to a more uncertain
bureaucratic process. This, then, spurs the question what kind of uncertainties street-
level bureaucrats experience in their day-to-day task and how they navigate these.
This is an important topic of study, because it gives insight in the aspects of frontline
work that are commonly not visible and likely affect the transparency and predict-
ability of frontline service provision and law enforcement.
This study aims to theoretically advance our understanding of frontline officials’
experiences of uncertainty, within a policy context that emphasizes horizontal rela-
tionships with citizens, and where frontline officials are endowed with much leeway
to make decisions based on their own interpretations. By studying Dutch frontline
tax officials working with a policy that promotes responsiveness and trust, this paper
aims to answer the following research question: what kind of uncertainties do front-
line tax officials experience, how do officials respond, and what are the sources of these
uncertainties? By focusing on tax officials, this study furthermore adds to the litera-
ture on street-level bureaucracy where the study of regulatory interactions is scarce
(but see e.g. Cohen and Gershgoren 2016; Nielsen 2007, 2015).1
This study builds on different scholarly traditions on bureaucracy. By assessing the
classical literature on bureaucracy and the street-level bureaucracy literature, this
paper distils different notions of uncertainty. This study seeks to uncover whether
(some of) these notions indeed describe the uncertainties experienced by frontline tax
officials, or whether we need to broaden our understanding of uncertainties at the
frontline. It furthermore explores the sources of these uncertainties to gain insight in
possible explanations of uncertainties at the frontline. After discussing the relevant
literature traditions, the case selection and methods will be described, and the
findings presented. This paper concludes with a discussion and directions for future
research.
Uncertainty as information problem
The traditional model of bureaucracy has been, from its very beginning, con-
cerned with uncertainty reduction within bureaucratic organizations (Weber
1922/1947; Thompson 1967/2003). Within this model, bureaucracies are seen as
rational organizations that should limit individual bureaucrats’ discretionary
powers by setting strict rules and procedures. Technocratic knowledge, embodied
in rules, procedures, and policies, is put at the heart of bureaucratic organizations.
The assumption is that rules and procedures could be applied directly to specific
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cases, without interference of the human factor, that is, individual bureaucrats’
own interpretations (Thompson 1967/2003).
With the recognition of the primacy of the human factor in bureaucratic
organizations, theories of bureaucratic decision-making also became a relevant
scholarly subject. Simon (1976) argued that objective rationality as depicted by
the ideal model did not reflect organizational reality. Organizational members’
actual behaviour is limited by incomplete knowledge about future consequences
and by people’s incapability of assessing all possible alternative behaviours
(Simon 1976; Downs 1966). In this situation of bounded rationality, bureaucrats
employ satisficing strategies in making decisions and rely on relatively simple
heuristics, shortcuts, or standard operating procedures (Simon 1976; Jones
2001). Despite the limitedness of their cognitive capabilities, bureaucrats are
still seen as actors that pursue goals by applying knowledge in order to resolve
uncertainties prior to decision-making. According to this perspective, uncer-
tainty in the form of ‘unknowns’ is involved at all times. From a perspective
that views technical knowledge as a means to control administrative work,
‘unknowns’ are deemed problematic. Uncertainty is, in this perspective, per-
ceived as an information problem. Technical knowledge, albeit embodied in rules
or standard procedures, is supposed to offer bureaucrats a sense of certainty,
since having knowledge about a situation offers the possibility to master a
situation and to act on it.
Uncertainty as interpretation problem
Since Lipsky’s seminal work (1980) on street-level bureaucracy, the scholarly focus
has shifted from a view on bureaucrats as ‘cogs in machine’ serving the larger
powers, to a view in which bureaucrats’ discretion in their daily encounters with
citizens is acknowledged and considered a valuable subject of research (Bartels
2013). Research has pointed out that bureaucrats’ discretionary practices are not
only informed by organizational classification systems and rules but also by
personal judgements regarding clients’ worthiness or deservingness, based on
cultural schemes, moral beliefs and values, or certain stereotypes (Dubois 2013;
Harrits and Møller 2014; Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003;
Mennerick 1974; Prottas 1979). Within the literature on bureaucratic encounters,
it is argued, in this respect, that ‘there are no unambiguous criteria to discern
citizen-client worthiness’, and that it is never ‘simple or straightforward’
(Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, p. 119).
The street-level bureaucracy literature, then, sheds a different light on bureaucratic
decision-making. Knowledge is not simply ‘out there’ for bureaucrats to rely upon
and apply in practice, but the ‘instances’ facing the organization need to be inter-
preted ‘in order to make these instances intelligible in the light of the organizational
life-world’ (Handelman 1978, p. 15). In creating a single, consistent, and authoritative
account of ‘what happened’, bureaucrats find themselves mulling over new informa-
tion casting doubt on clients’ stories, leading them to reinterpret old information.
Bureaucrats construct hypothetical story lines that are only finalized by bureaucratic
closure (Fassin 2013; Handelman 1978). The source of uncertainties, then, is not so
much an absence of information, but rather a problem of interpretation of what ‘is
really happening’.
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Uncertainty of social interactions
Inherent to discretion is the assumption that it is only in the encounter with specific
cases that rules are enacted (Lipsky 1980). Discretion at the frontlines ‘is necessary to
respond to the unexpected and to ensure that services are responsive to individual
need’ (Evans 2015, p. 281). This emphasizes a more fundamental notion of uncer-
tainty: the uncertainty that is always part of social interactions. The street-level
bureaucracy literature points to the unpredictability of street-level work (Lipsky
1980; Vinzant and Crothers 1998; Wagenaar 2004), and the tensions of face-to-face
encounters (Dubois 2014). Discretion always involves interaction between known
abstract rules and yet unknown particulars. How these particulars manifest them-
selves is dependent on unpredictable interactions with citizen-clients.
This kind of uncertainty has received far less attention within the public admin-
istration literature on frontline work. The uncertainty that is inherent to discretion is
treated as given. Insight in the uncertainties experienced by street-level bureaucrats
themselves could give insight in the aspects of frontline work which are invisible, but
which likely affect street-level behaviour and decision-making.
Research site
This research is conducted within the Dutch tax administration. It focuses on front-
line officials who audit tax returns of small and medium sized businesses and have
face-to-face interactions with entrepreneurs as part of their job. Under the heading of
the so-called horizontal supervision approach, the Dutch tax administration has
moved from a vertical command and control approach to responsive and collabora-
tive regulation and enforcement (Gribnau 2007). As a consequence, the interactional
processes between officials and taxpayers are seen as crucial in fostering compliant
behaviour. This horizontal policy encourages officials to assess tax returns on their
acceptability, rather than their mere correctness, which means officials are discour-
aged to correct little mistakes. Moreover, officials are encouraged to make settlement
agreements with entrepreneurs when mistakes are encountered.
To assess the acceptability of tax returns, officials audit entrepreneurs’ bookkeep-
ing records and operational processes. They also assess entrepreneurs’ intentions in
order to advice the specialist who decides about the possible fine. Tax officials finalize
their audit by writing a report in which decisions on corrections and possible fines
are substantiated. When finished, this report is sent to the audit manager for a last
check, before it is sent to the client. The cases tax officials audit are selected on a
central level in the organization, based on predetermined risks. It is officials’ task to
determine whether something is really wrong and whether it came about by mistake,
negligence, or fraud.
Like other street-level bureaucrats, such as social workers and police officers, tax
officials have face-to-face encounters with citizen-clients and have considerable dis-
cretion in interpreting cases and making decisions (Cohen and Gershgoren 2016;
Fineman 1998; Nielsen 2015). Tax officials’ work is characterized not only by a
considerable amount of tax laws and regulations but also by much leeway for
interpretation. Tax officials moreover work under ‘countless pressures and con-
straints’ (Cohen and Gershgoren 2016, p. 269), such as time pressure, incomplete
information, ambiguous rules and regulation, and conflicting work principles (e.g.
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Schott, Van Kleef, and Noordegraaf 2016). In these respects, tax officials share the
core characteristics of street-level bureaucrats. However, there are some character-
istics of tax officials’ work that set them apart from typical street-level bureaucrats.
First, the rules and legislation tax officials work with can be complex and are not
common knowledge (Nielsen 2015), and officials possess much prior information
about the inspected citizen-client (Cohen and Gershgoren 2016). Second, interactions
are typically initiated by tax officials who are mandated to inspect specific enterprises,
and entrepreneurs cannot simply exit these interactions (Nielsen 2015). These char-
acteristics make tax officials a powerful type of street-level bureaucrats.
Methods
Seventeen frontline tax officials were interviewed, of whom 14 are male and 3 are
female.2 Respondents were selected on theoretical grounds: respondents are all work-
ing with the horizontal supervision policy and have face-to-face interactions with
entrepreneurs. This selection made it possible to study the uncertainties in a frontline
context where rules and regulation have become less strict, and officials have more
room for interpretation. Within this selection frame, this study aimed for a sample
consisting of both male and female officials, as well as newcomers and veterans
within the organization, as to be able to grasp a variety of experiences. Tax officials
from different tax offices across the Netherlands were interviewed. The respondents
were introduced to the study either by the researcher, or by their manager who
approached them with the request for participation. The small number of women in
the sample is due to the paucity of women working for the Dutch tax administration
and, as such, corresponds with the male–female ratio in the organization as a whole.
Ten respondents have been in service for over 30 years, one for 18 years, and six have
been in service for less than 10 years.
This study focused on bureaucrats’ detailed stories about face-to-face encounters
with citizen-clients. Stories give insight in the meanings people attach to situations,
and how they make decisions based on their own perceptions of situations (e.g.
Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). This method is preferable over direct ques-
tioning, since the latter method commonly yields rationalized answers, whereas
storytelling probes respondents’ meaningful experiences. Within an interview setting,
respondents were asked to tell stories about situations they experienced as difficult or
complicated.3 Besides that, questions were asked about officials’ daily activities,
experiences at work, doubts, and interactions with entrepreneurs and colleagues.
The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim.4
Thirty-seven stories were selected for analysis. The situations described within the
stories were all problematized, and all stories refer to experienced unknowns or
ignorance. Within the analysis of the stories, the three uncertainties described
above served as sensitizing concepts. Within the first step, the stories were coded
using detailed codes that were still close to the data. Officials’ responses were coded
as well. The detailed codes were then confronted with the sensitizing concepts, in
order to look whether they could be understood as a particular kind of uncertainty.
The detailed codes within the more generic codes were compared and grouped into
sub-codes if they were similar on a particular aspect and different from other codes.
As a final step all the stories were read again and assessed on their fit. Stories were
recoded when necessary. In the coding process, tensions in the emerging patterns
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were explicitly searched for, which led to re-examinations of the stories and inter-
pretations. Table 1 displays the final code tree.
The sub-themes are distinguished based on the conditions under which they occur
(see table A1 in Appendix for coding table). Within the remaining of this article, the
main patterns and most exemplary stories will be presented and discussed.
Finding proof
The first general theme refers to a lack of information. By creating an account or
storyline supported by sufficient evidence, tax officials equip themselves for the
negotiation with citizen-clients,5 and when it gets that far, for the judicial trial. Tax
officials ask themselves whether their account of the situation remains standing
against the arguments and evidence raised by citizen-clients and/or their accountants.
The following story aptly shows that the process of finding proof is highly inter-
twined with constructing a convincing account.
‘How are we going to prove he’s withholding a part of his turnover?’
(respondent 7)
Well, with this hospitality business you actually need several sources to say that someone’s
bookkeeping is not true. (. . .) How are we going to prove that he’s withholding a part of his
turnover? Yeah, then you are . . . you actually look at the process of [the moment] the customer
comes in and places his order.What is done with the order by the servers? How does it go through
the process of this hospitality business? What did the entrepreneur say about this? Well, where
could it have gone wrong? (. . .) What if he says he registers everything he has sold. Well, then the
cash register tells you what he’s sold. What can we do more? We have data about related
businesses and their gross profit ourselves. How can we, then, further prove? Well, then we’re
going to do a third-party investigation. Is that difficult? Maybe not, but you have to try to go
through the process and look at what happens, at where we can find a starting point for the
substantiation of our numbers, and for the position the entrepreneur adopted. Or for the thing we
expect that could possibly be wrong.We try to quantify that. And yeah, to create a calculation that
is clear, and understandable, for both him and us, with which . . . well yeah, we can go to court in
the end. Where the judge again also says like okay, tax administration, you clearly and credibly
mapped this out, and made it plausible that the entrepreneur committed fraud. Yeah, how
difficult is that. . .(. . ..)
Table 1. Coding table with number of stories.
Information uncertainty
Finding proof (4 stories)
Interpretation uncertainty
Experiencing dilemmas (8 stories)
Determining right decision (4 stories)
Action uncertainty
Negotiating with clients (3 stories)
Responding to client’s emotions and private situations (10 stories)
Impact of client’s private situation on interaction (4)
Impact of client’s emotions on interaction (5)
Intrusion into official’s private life (1)
Encountering deviations from normalcy (8 stories)
Dealing with not cooperating entrepreneurs (2)
Dealing with complex or messy bookkeeping records (3)
Dealing with the legal logic (3)
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Yeah [it’s about finding] the strongest proofs, which apply to the matter of course, but
which you can also create, and which are communicable, also to the entrepreneur. It has to be
understandable to the entrepreneur. It doesn’t make any sense to make something . . . a nice
mathematical formula, for instance, of which you as a mathematician think it’s evidence, but
don’t get it explained and understood. Well yeah, then it stops. You can better take something
which the entrepreneur has an understanding of, and use that, and his own stories, to provide
rebuttal proof, to support your statement that he didn’t register everything of his turnover. To
create another picture that is understood by the entrepreneur.
This problem of information is a particular one. The story shows that the
respondent did not search information out of a sense of uncertainty regarding
what happened. In fact, the respondent strongly felt that his account of the situation
was true, because he had cues to believe so. The uncertainty rather consists in not
knowing whether one is able to find enough evidence to substantiate one’s account of
the situation. This story shows how the respondent looks for more proof and tries to
make a persuasive account with the collected evidence. Looking for more proof, for
example, by means of third-party investigations, is also a common response in other
stories within this theme. The emphasis is on constructing a convincing report with
sufficient proof. Some respondents argue that when they are in doubt about whether
they have a strong enough case, they sometimes satisfice and give their report a try to
wait and see whether entrepreneurs will object or not.
Ambiguity of interpretation
Interpretation problems, the second theme, can be distinguished from information
problems. Whereas more information helps respondents in substantiating their
account, it does not necessarily help them when they face situations that are difficult
to interpret. As the following stories show, interpretation problems do not arise
because there is an absence of information, but because the standards officials (can)
use to evaluate cases are conflicting or vague in themselves. Two sorts of interpreta-
tion problems appear to be at play in tax officials’ work: dilemmas and grey area
interpretations.
Dilemmas
Stories about dilemmas mostly come down to a tension between what one ought to
do as a tax official and one’s personal values or ideas about what is appropriate, or
one’s feelings of empathy. This happens in different ways: first, when officials have to
make decisions that have a profound impact on citizen-clients’ lives, which challenges
their personal feelings of empathy. Second, when officials have to make decisions that
let entrepreneurs go on as usual, whereas they actually feel they should be put to a
halt. The following story is an example of the former. The respondent in this story
discovered that the entrepreneur did not keep mileage records of his lease car,
because his accountant told him he did not have to.
‘Then I really have to leave it behind me’ (respondent 5)
The entrepreneur called his accountant, and they had a tough conversation. The accountant is
of course always immune, because he does it [the records] for the entrepreneur. The
entrepreneur is always responsible for his own bookkeeping records and tax return. Yeah,
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the entrepreneur also felt it was going to cost him a lot of money. So it wasn’t a nice
conversation between the entrepreneur and the accountant. (. . .) The annoying part is that it
was on the Friday before my vacation, and it already had taken a long time before I could
make an appointment with him. I’m still in the human side of it, occasionally, because I of
course brought him really bad news. Then I really have to leave it behind me. I knew he was
also going on vacation that Saturday. The only thing that can work positively for him, is that
he had a black box installed in his car. But eh, he never made a printout of it or whatsoever.
So I said to him that he could maybe contact that company to request that data, and maybe
puzzle with it. That’s the only thing we could still do. But that man wasn’t amused with his
accountant. The entrepreneur called me that day to say he talked with the accountant and
they’re going to try to get that data. But he said he was going on vacation with a strange
feeling. Then I notice I really have to leave it behind me, that I have to think: ‘okay, it went
wrong, and he’s going on vacation, me too, and I have to let go of it. It’s his problem’. I mean,
(. . .) yeah, you just have to do your job. If you see something is going wrong, then you
shouldn’t be pathetic about it. That’s the thing I run into occasionally, like, come on, this is
the way it is, and not like that lovely motherly, worrisome feeling of how are we going to fix
this for you.
The story shows how the respondent struggles between following her feelings of
empathy and carrying out her job. The ‘human side’ the respondent talks about
makes her see different aspects of the case, than when she looks at it from the
perspective of the law enforcer. The different interpretations do not compete over
becoming the most truthful account, since both are obviously true for this respon-
dent. In fact, they are based on different notions of fairness; one sticking to the law
and highlighting the ‘objective’ error, the other shedding its light more broadly, also
highlighting the entrepreneur’s private situation and mitigating circumstances. The
story furthermore shows how the respondent follows the formal route and tries to
look at it professionally but still finds a way to cater to her feelings of empathy.
The other stories within this theme, likewise, show how respondents’ feelings of
empathy lead them to also look at entrepreneurs’ private situations. However, most
respondents argued they decided – sometimes after consulting colleagues – to stick to
the formal route, and to look for other ways to help entrepreneurs.
Grey area interpretations
The grey area of rules and legislation elicits a second kind of interpretation uncer-
tainty, which entails the question what is the right interpretation of the situation at
hand. In the following story, the tax official not only problematizes this room for
interpretation, but also the consequences in terms of differential treatment of similar
cases.
‘That’s easily said by the minister, good is good enough. But what is
good enough?’ (respondent 13)
We have the policy of good is good enough. That’s also the difficult area of tension of
frontline inspectors. That’s easily said by the minister, good is good enough. But what is good
enough? Letting go ten thousand euros? Is it [laughs] a thousand euros? That’s what makes it
difficult for us. He could better have said: ‘let it go to a five thousand euros difference’. (. . .)
Because you can better say, very strictly, just as we do with kilometers, that 501 kilometers is
too much for the private use of a car. That’s very clear to us. That’s also very easy to inspect.
(. . .). While lately, I had an employment services case . . . I think we really favored him (. . .).
Yeah, that’s a difficult matter; they were classified in the wrong sector, which saved them
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almost sixty percent of premium to the tax administration. And they had a wage bill of a
twenty million. Do the math; hundred-and-twenty thousand euros a year. I could have
corrected four years. Then they would have been bankrupt. Five hundred people are working
there . . . yeah, is that what you want?
This respondent, thus, experienced difficulty in determining what is good
enough, which is part of the new policy that encourages officials to look at the
acceptability of tax returns. He continued his story by telling about a case which
was favoured. Later in the interview, he said that he struggles with the question:
‘why do I correct in one case, and not in another? You always have that struggle’.
The ‘grey area’ in rules and regulation thus engenders difficulties in determining
the right decision but – afterwards – also leads to personal struggles about whether
the decision is fair in terms of equality. Within the grey area, this respondent
argued, ‘you have to make sure you have someone with you, or two, three persons,
with whom you deliberate’. In the absence of clear standards about what is right in
these instances, stories show how colleagues are consulted to come to a decision
that is supported by colleagues.
Action uncertainty
Officials’ stories show how difficult social interactions often boil down to (a fear
of) losing control over situations or not knowing how to proceed to get control
over situations. Within respondents’ stories different factors are associated with
such uncertainties: unexpectedness of the situation, necessity of immediate action,
and deviance from ‘normal’ situations. In situations with one or more of these
factors present, officials often need to improvise on spot and/or need to change
their plan of action. Officials are, thus, uncertain about their actions: they feel put
on the spot, cannot carefully think through, and prepare their actions, or their
prepared plan of action does not suffice. Officials feel they (might) lose control
over the situation and the outcome. Officials’ stories about action uncertainties are
clustered around three sub-themes: emotional labour, negotiations, and deviations
from normality. In what follows, the sub-themes will be discussed by using
exemplary stories.
Emotional labour
A problem often referred to in tax officials’ stories stems from the fluid boundary
between citizen-clients’ work life and private life. Tax officials share the basic
expectation that the interaction with citizen-clients will occur ‘professionally’, that
is, that it will centre around the citizen-client as entrepreneur who, in turn,
approaches the tax official as a professional in performing the inspection task.
When an interaction unfolds professionally, tax officials know what to expect and
do. However, when ‘private life’ leaks into the encounter, tax officials experience this
as difficult because they need to make immediate assessments of the situation and
manage emotions. Respondents’ stories show that this boundary is crossed when
entrepreneurs’ private situations or emotions influence the course of an interaction,
and when entrepreneurs get personal at tax officials. The following story shows how
an entrepreneur’s unexpected emotional reaction leads to a deeply discomforting
experience requiring on-the-spot emotional labour.
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‘How am I going to deal with this?’ (respondent 16)
The strange thing was, I called that man, and normally you have a conversation, well, but this
person was ranting on the telephone. Really, like, ‘what are you up to, why do you want to
come, and I don’t want you to come’, you know. Well for me it was, even with my experience,
yeah . . . I was sitting in a room with nine other colleagues, it was really busy . . . I hadn’t
anticipated on this. I thought, like, ‘how am I going to deal with this?’ So I let him blow off
steam, and tried to get the conversation uh . . . under control again. That has to be feasible
with my experience. I walked out of that room to another room to be able to have a calm
conversation, and to assess what actually happened. Because I didn’t expect this at all, I never
experienced that. (. . .) In such a conversation you really have to switch a lot; what am I
dealing with, why does he react like that? Nowadays we work a lot with email. So I tried to
make that step and said ‘if you give me your email address then I send you a confirmation,
then you also have all my details (. . .) so you can check that if you want to’. (. . .) Well yeah, at
some point I had the conversation under control again. I managed to get in conversation with
him again and to get his email address. That’s an important step nowadays, because then you
can reach him and he cannot flee anymore. (. . .) Well yeah, I was a bit perplexed by it.
This story shows the unexpectedness of the entrepreneur’s emotional reaction, the
loss of control, and the deeply felt discomfort. The respondent stresses the impor-
tance of getting the conversation under control again, and the action uncertainty
accompanying that. The other stories show that such action uncertainties are mostly
experienced on-site, where some respondents stayed at the inspection site and tried to
make the situation ‘workable’ again, and others immediately left because they felt
(sometimes physically) unsafe. In making such improvisational assessments and
judgements, officials sometimes later on discover, and struggle with the fact, that
they made a wrong decision.
Negotiating
Officials sometimes need and are even encouraged to negotiate with entrepreneurs,
when there is disagreement about an interpretation of the law, or about how much
money has been withheld, and the official does not have enough proof for his/her
suspicions. The stories about negotiations bear witness to an uncertainty regarding
assessing the other party’s stance and willingness to accept the tax official’s inter-
pretation, and the discomfort it brings when the negotiation does not happen as
wished. Next story shows the struggle the official experienced because he lost control
over the situation.
‘In retrospect I think we shouldn’t have been so quick in . . . it’s true, you
always learn’ (respondent 13)
Sometimes I think like yeah, maybe we’ve been too accommodating in that world [of
employment agencies]. Because we sometimes have like, okay, let’s do this, we already correct
so much. And afterwards in the final conversation it doesn’t go like you . . . and then you
think in retrospect: ‘damn, if we only had corrected that as well, because he doesn’t actually
deserve it’. But you of course already made your decision. And you certainly keep struggling
with that. I cannot deny that, you always keep struggling with that. (. . .). Yeah, I’m certainly
not the only one, I’m convinced of that. (. . .). That’s what we experienced with that big
entrepreneur (. . .). We’ve given away quite a lot; we decided that, and expressed it, and now,
afterwards, they are getting difficult about the corporate income tax. Maybe it’s justice. . .. In
retrospect, we maybe shouldn’t have been so quick in . . . that’s true, you always learn. Maybe
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it would’ve been more convenient to have waited with real statements until the final
conversation, then we would maybe have had some change. Like, ‘okay, we give you the
sector premium, we all accept this, but the corporate tax to the contrary. . ..’ Then I would
have had a better feeling maybe. But now I actually think it has been really much from my
side, in retrospect. While we actually have been so open (…) And that’s the area of tension; I
was maybe too quick in…. Then I am struggling with it for a week. I think ‘damn’, and am
bothered by the fact I actually gave away something, and he’s making a fuss about this other
thing. Maybe I shouldn’t have done it. That’s the learning process. I wouldn’t do this again,
certainly if it’s about much money. So next time, I’m not going to struggle with this.
In negotiating, the respondent experienced uncertainty regarding the entrepre-
neurs’ stance and willingness to accept tax official’s claims. Even more prominent in
this story is the discomfort the official experiences after having found out he has been
too open and has given away too much already early in the negotiation. The
respondent feels that his openness towards the entrepreneur is exploited for personal
gain, which is experienced as utterly unfair.
Deviations from normalcy
Some stories were about situations that could not be understood or handled by
relying on the ‘normal ways’ of understanding and working. Some cases are
considered rather complex and chaotic, which make it hard for tax officials to
get an understanding of what is exactly happening. The stories about such
complex cases show the difficulty tax officials experience in disentangling the
operational processes of these businesses before they reach the core of their task,
that is, assessing whether the accounting records are acceptable. One respondent
describes this difficulty as follows: ‘It’s a difficult process, (. . .) it’s not a little
project of which I know exactly what to do and where to look at tomorrow. With
this kind of projects, it’s complex’ (respondent 11). Although officials often have
more time to work on such cases, stories show officials do not know exactly what
to do to get an understanding of such complex situations, because they already
figured out (sometimes after having done quite some work) that their ‘normal’
inspection approach fell short. This sometimes involves a realization that officials
have been doing work that should have been done by the entrepreneur, and that
complexity might have been deliberately created to make things difficult. Stories
show how entrepreneurs are dependent on the input of entrepreneurs and their
advisors to get an understanding and to do the actual inspection: ‘You have to
make sure the advisor is collaborating. And that’s the difficult thing, because he
gets paid very well by the entrepreneur’ (respondent 11).
The other stories within this theme show how entrepreneurs witness deviations
from ‘normal’ behaviour and need to change their approach in order to deal with
this. These stories are about entrepreneurs who do not cooperate, and about foot-
dragging entrepreneurs who solely look at the legal aspects of an inspection rather
than at the actual content. In such interactions, officials are ‘on guard’ and closely
monitor their own actions, because of the fear to get sued:
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‘Then you have to pay attention to how you’re going to maneuver’
(respondent 8)
They’ve hired two expensive guys from Deloitte, yeah, then you have to pay attention to how
you’re going to maneuver. (. . .) I don’t have much problems with the fiscal side. But they are
focusing on the formal side; are you acting correctly, and is the principle of an adversarial
process respected? They are really much on the formal side of a correction. So if it’s not going
well, and it finds its way to court, then they’ll say: ‘it’s all well and good, but according to the
law, this should have been done’. Yeah, then your correction is gone.
These advisors thus focus on how an inspection is done, which conflicts with the
respondent’s common focus on the content of the inspection. Another respondent
also argues that such people are ‘only looking at the legal aspects, and (. . .) not
looking at what we are correcting’ (respondent 13). Officials feel their on-the-spot
actions are under close scrutiny and can have major consequences for the course and
outcome of an inspection. Table 2 provides descriptions of the different uncertainties
found.
Exploring the sources of uncertainty
As a last step, the sources of the different kinds of uncertainty were explored to gain
insight in possible explanations. Respondents’ stories show that different factors
underpin and sometimes reinforce uncertainties. Some factors are inherent to front-
line work in general, some seem specific to tax officials’ work, some to the policy of
‘horizontal supervision’ and others to societal changes.
A question about the truthfulness of entrepreneurs’ accounts of reality is under-
lying officials’ focus on substantiation and proof. The assumption is that there is an
underlying truth, which can never be fully known. One respondent argues: ‘you never
know how much black money is involved, it’s always a guess. Yeah and we have to
prove it’ (respondent 17). Another respondent explains what makes it hard: whereas
you generally inspect what is there, black money is about inspecting ‘what isn’t there,
but which should have been there’ (respondent 16). This respondent also tells one
can never be sure about whether an entrepreneur is ‘playing’ or not. This question is
probably inherent to frontline work, and more pressing in situations where officials,
Table 2. Description of the kinds of uncertainty at play in frontline tax officials’ work.
Information uncertainty Interpretation uncertainty Action uncertainty
Problem of Proof Standards Control
Contexts in
which they
occur
Lack of evidence to support
one’s interpretation
Vague rules and
legislation
Conflicting norms, values,
feelings
Impact of citizen-clients’
private lives and emotions
Negotiations with citizen-
clients
Deviations from normality
Difficulties
experienced
Vague stories of citizen-
clients
Conflicting informational
cues
Comprehensibility of account
is not clear-cut affair
Finding proof requires effort
and time
Law insufficient as
backing
Potential inconsistent
decision-making
Far-reaching
consequences for
citizen-clients
On-the-spot reaction
Consequentiality of official’s
immediate reaction
Change of inspection
approach
Dependence on citizen- client
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such as tax officials, need to rely on citizen-clients as a source of information. This
unfathomable character of ‘the truth’ could explain why respondents are not neces-
sarily preoccupied with finding out every detail of ‘the truth’, but with finding proof
and constructing convincing accounts.
Room for interpretation of rules and regulation is inherent to discretionary front-
line work, and sometimes involves ambiguity when these rules need to be interpreted
in specific situations. In assessing specific cases against standards, officials sometimes
question such standards when large deviations are encountered: ‘Could that standard
be too generic, and could it [the case] deviate?’ (respondent 16). Also when it comes
down to determining the height of fines, officials emphasize they have much leeway,
which they sometimes struggle with: ‘It’s actually all wrong, but the correction is
already very high. Should you then also impose such a high fine? It may be stated in
the law, but we have the freedom to struggle with it’ (respondent 13). Stories have
shown that this leeway or ‘freedom to struggle’ involves dilemmas between following
the law on the one hand and feelings of empathy on the other hand. Whereas
interpretation leeway is inherent to discretion, within the policy of ‘horizontal super-
vision’ it is enlarged and seen as part of professional judgement. Tax returns are not
simply good or wrong, but acceptable or not, and the standards to assess this
acceptability are purposefully left more open and up to the frontline official to assess.
These stories show that this is not always an easy task and such grey areas involve
struggles about what is right. This horizontal policy, furthermore, encourages officials
to make settlement agreements with entrepreneurs when there is disagreement about
an interpretation of the law, or the amount of money that has been withheld.
Officials’ stories show how negotiations emanating from this are experienced as
deeply discomforting when officials feel they (may) lose control over the situation
and the outcome, or when they feel the resulting outcomes are not fair. The
horizontal policy, thus, puts more weight to officials’ on-the-spot actions and nego-
tiation skills, involving action uncertainties.
The indeterminacy of interactions with clients most prominently emerged as a
factor underlying tax officials’ action uncertainties. How an interaction unfolds is
only predictable to some extent; based on repeated experiences, tax officials form
certain expectations of how interactions normally unfold. However, tax officials
acknowledge that social interactions with citizen-clients are indeterminate: ‘you’re
on completely unknown territory, and . . . you have to wait and see what’ll happen
inside’ (respondent 3). This social uncertainty is inherent to frontline work, and
interactions are sites where officials possibly lose control. Action problems within
complex cases, moreover, often involve information and interpretation uncertainties.
In complex cases, respondents commonly lose ‘overview because of all the details’
(Respondent 6) and do not know what to do exactly in order to get this overview and
need to rely on entrepreneurs’ input. The stories about such complex cases show that
uncertainty about how to get a grip on such situations is reinforced by a lack of
insight in the operational processes of a business, ‘shortcomings’ of the law, and
absence of the jurisprudence.
Lastly, respondents acknowledge that aversion towards the tax administration on
the part of entrepreneurs is inherent to their work, because of negative prior inter-
actions or a belief that tax officials only come to get money. Therefore, tax officials
are mindful of entrepreneurs’ emotions. Some respondents associate emotional
interactions and foot-dragging entrepreneurs with hard economic times. One
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respondent argues, for instance, that entrepreneurs in a particular sector are foot-
dragging and committing fraud because ‘they cannot do otherwise, because their
prices are under pressure’ (respondent 13). Another respondent holds that he already
knows the situation is not going to be nice when someone has ‘bad figures, and the
economy is getting worse’ (respondent 3).
Conclusion and discussion
In line with the rational view on bureaucracy, tax officials experienced problems of
information. They, however, were not in the dark about what happened. Rather, they
already seemed to know very well what was the matter and looked for proof
supporting their account. In accordance with uncertainty as discussed within
street-level bureaucracy literature, tax officials also experienced interpretation pro-
blems. Interpretation problems entail difficulties with standards to make decisions,
that is, conflicting feelings and norms and vague rules and regulation. These yield
questions as to what is right. Tax officials indicate they deliberate with colleagues in
case of doubt, in order to have a back-up and to struggle less with it afterwards. This
study also found that tax officials face action uncertainties. Action problems involve
uncertainty about control, that is, (a fear of) losing it in interaction with the
entrepreneur, or about how to get it (back). This often happens in interaction with
entrepreneurs and their businesses, which can never be fully predicted. This puts
officials on guard because they often need to take ad hoc action and feel their on-the-
spot actions weigh heavily on the course and outcome of an interaction.
This study also explored the sources of these uncertainties and has shown that
there are structural aspects of frontline work, such as the ‘unknowable truth’ and
ambiguous character of rules and regulation, that underpin officials’ search for proof
and uncertainty about what is right. In addition, stories also point to the ‘horizontal
supervision policy’ as a source of different uncertainties. It gives frontline officials
more room for interpretation, which sometimes involves doubt about what is the
right decision. This policy furthermore encourages officials to negotiate with citizen-
clients, where officials feel they possibly lose control. Economic hardships and the
undesirability of audits on the part entrepreneurs underlie the latter’s emotional
outburst in interactions.
These findings underline the importance of social interactions to bureaucratic
work and hence to understanding the role of uncertainty in bureaucracy. Whereas
public administration literature has pointed to the existence of information uncer-
tainties (e.g. Simon 1976), and interpretation uncertainties (Lipsky 1980), this study
adds a third kind: action uncertainties. These uncertainties are about how to maintain
or get control over situations (see Dubois 2014 on control practices), and can
generally not be resolved by gathering more information, relying on rules and
consulting colleagues, but require officials to make immediate assessments and
judgements. This raises interesting questions with regards to the scholarly writing
on street-level discretion and control. Much research on street-level bureaucracies has
been done within what is depicted by Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2012) as the
‘implementation-control-discretion narrative’, focusing on how street-level bureau-
crats make decisions within given rules, and rely on abstract knowledge. This current
study shows that some frontline situations are, by their very nature, difficult to
control by street-level bureaucrats, let alone by upper level managers. An important
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line of future research, then, is exploring how frontline officials improvise and rely on
practical knowledge in face of uncertain situations (see Maynard-Moody and
Musheno 2012; Wagenaar 2004). What are the beliefs, understandings, values, and
even emotions officials rely upon to deal with these action uncertainties?
Moreover, whereas the street-level bureaucracy literature has a tradition of explaining
frontline discretion, pointing to the influence of characteristics of the work context,
frontline officials, and citizen-clients, this study points to the importance of a more
dynamic understanding of frontline decision-making. Research approaches should allow
for the study of interaction processes, citizen-clients’ perspectives, and their negotiation
and communication skills (e.g. Bartels 2014), especially in policy contexts where inter-
personal notions such as trust are emphasized. Although such policies may yield more
responsive law enforcement and service provision, they could thus also compromise
consistent and fair decision-making, especially when certain types of citizen-clients have
better negotiation and communication skills to take control in bureaucratic interactions.
The findings also have implications for the accountability and public manage-
ment literature. This study has shown that a policy that gives more leeway to
street-level officials could constitute a source of uncertainties at the frontline. The
act of categorization is delegated to individual officials who, to recall one of our
respondents, have the ‘freedom to struggle’. It practically means that officials have
to work with rules and legislation that are vaguer, and that they are encouraged to
negotiate with citizen-clients when there is disagreement in ‘grey areas’. This study
has shown that officials often deliberate – on their own initiative – with colleagues
to deal with interpretation uncertainty and to have ‘a backing’, which is in the
literature also referred to as ‘professional accountability’ (Hupe and Hill 2007).
Future research should focus on whether and how frontline officials working with
such horizontal policies collectively deal with uncertainties, and whether and how
management has an influence on these deliberation practices (see Piore 2011; Rutz
et al. 2015).
A limitation is that this study solely used the storytelling method. Whereas the
rich narratives yield insight in the uncertainties experienced and the meanings
attached to these, they are less apt to study officials’ actual behaviour. This study
has given insight in how officials meaningfully deal with uncertainties experienced
and offered a first step in showing possible explanations. Future studies could
complement this effort by conducting participant observations and experiments to
study officials’ behaviours under different conditions. Another limitation of this
study is its focus on a particular type of street-level bureaucrats. This study has
yielded insight in the uncertainties of street-level bureaucrats who have much dis-
cretion, a lot of information about citizen-clients, and who have come to work with
less strict rules and regulation. It is likely that street-level bureaucrats with less
discretion, less information available, and ‘a never-ending demand for more and
better services’ (Nielsen 2015, p. 117) experience these uncertainties differently and
with a different importance. Comparative research is needed to develop a theory on
uncertainty at the frontlines. To this end, future research could compare uncertainties
experienced within different policy fields and different types of street-level bureau-
crats to theoretically advance this field of study.
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Notes
1. The literature on regulationmainly focuses on conceptualizing andmeasuring regulatees’ compliance
to regulations, rather than on inspectors’ use of discretion.Within this study, we are interested in how
inspectors experience the uncertainty which is part and parcel of their discretion. For this reason, we
mainly drawon the literature traditions thatmore broadly focus on frontline officials’use of discretion.
2. To ensure ethical standards for data collection, different steps were taken. First, access to the
organization was approved in advance by the director of the Dutch tax authorities and the director
of the Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SME) division. As part of this, a confidentiality
agreement was signed by the researcher, declaring that sensitive information about clients is treated
as confidential. Second, respondents voluntarily participated to this research, and no consequences
were attached to non-participation. Third, during the interviews, the interviewer ensured the
respondents that the data (audio and transcripts) were processed anonymously, treated confiden-
tially, and were not distributed to their managers or other people within the organization. The
interviewer assured respondents that there were no good or wrong answers and that they could quit
the interview or ask questions at all times. Fourth, interview transcripts were sent to the respondents
afterwards, which gave them the possibility to read the conversation.
3. Within the first interviews, the suitability of different interview questions to answer the research
question was assessed. The author started out with questioning whether respondents could tell a
story about an inspection, where they had face-to-face contact with citizen-clients, in which they
experienced uncertainty. This did not yield rich stories, but mostly questions about what was meant
by uncertainty. For this reason, uncertainty was replaced by experiences of difficulty or complexity.
This phrasing turned out to respond to tax officials’ lifeworld, since it yielded rich and long stories.
4. The researcher’s unfamiliarity and lack of substantive knowledge about auditing could have affected
the way respondents told their stories. Many respondents asked whether their stories were too
detailed or difficult to understand, and whether they needed to give more explanation. Sometimes
this was done, and at other times, this was not necessary in order to understand the underlying
message. It could also have affected the level of substantive detail with which stories are told in the
first place. However, there are no reasons to assume this has affected the kinds of uncertainty that
have been put forward in the stories. Also, respondents were encouraged to tell the stories as they
wished to, and that if clarification was needed, the researcher would ask for this.
5. The words citizen-clients and entrepreneurs are used interchangeably in the findings section to
denote the business owners officials are inspecting.
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Appendix
Table A1. Uncertainties in context and conditions under which they occur
Kinds of uncertainty in context When do they occur?
Information uncertainty
Finding proof Knowing or feeling something is the case but not having (enough)
evidence (4)
Interpretation uncertainty
Experiencing dilemmas Experiencing tension between task as tax official, feelings of empathy
and ideas of justice (8)
Determining the right decision Working with vague or too generic rules and regulation (4)
Action uncertainty
Negotiating with clients Not knowing what other party will bring to table or accept and
whether official gives away too much (3)
Responding to client emotions and
private situations
Encountering
influence of clients’ private situation on encounter (4)
influence of clients’ emotions on encounter (5)
a client infringing on official’s private life (1)
Encountering deviations from
normalcy
Encountering
foot-dragging by clients (3)
complex, messy or absent bookkeeping records (3)
unexpected reaction of client (2)
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